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Abstract. This paper is concerned with rhetorical argumentation that aims to
alter the beliefs of the listener, and so to influence his future actions, as opposed
to classical argumentation that is concerned with the generation of arguments,
usually as logical proofs, for and against a given course of action. Rhetorical ar-
gumentation includes rhetoric moves such as Threat, Reward and Appeal. Rhetor-
ical argumentative utterances generated by an agent contribute to the strength of
its relationship with the listener. This paper examines advice and the rhetoric par-
ticle “I advise you . . . ” that may be used to strengthen such relationships.
1 Introduction
The study of argumentation is in two camps: first, classical argumentation that is con-
cerned with the generation of arguments, usually as logical proofs, for and against a
given course of action that support decision making processes; and second, rhetorical
argumentation that aims to alter the beliefs of the listener, and is the focus of this pa-
per. The seminal work [1] builds on the notion of one argument “attacking” another;
we are more interested in how to counter the effect of the partner agent’s arguments
rhetorically, and how to lead a dialogue towards some desired outcome. Rhetorical ar-
gumentation includes moves such as Threat, Reward and Appeal; although no formal
model of the meaning of these speech acts has been proposed yet. Argumentation in
this sense is concerned with building (business) relationships through shaping another
agent’s reasoning, beliefs and expectations [2].
Agents may attempt to counter their partner’s arguments with Inform statements.
The subject of an inform may be factual, e.g. “today is Tuesday”, or non-factual, e.g.
“this movie is exciting”. Opinions are non-factual informative speech acts, they are the
speaker’s evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in context, and may be used in an
attempt to build relationships with the listener. Advice is opinion that is uttered with the
aim of either changing the listeners beliefs or influencing the listener’s future actions,
e.g. “if I were you I would buy the Nikon”. We give the semantics of advice utterances
and describe their strategic use advice in argumentative dialogue [3].
In this paper an agent’s rationality is based on two basic suppositions: everything
in the world is constantly changing and not all facts can be known by an agent. An
agent will have its model of: the world, of the other agents and of itself evolving at
all time, and does not have, for instance, a fixed set of preferences. As it continually
receives information from the environment, i.e. it is situated in it, its beliefs change. In
particular, an agent changes its models both to manage its future dialogue and because
of what has already been said.
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When agents engage in argumentative dialogue they may attempt to discover the
objectives, needs or preferences of the other agent. This has the direct consequence of
updating the model of the other agent and so enabling the conversation to progress. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the communication language and advice illocutions. Section 3 proposes
a rational agent architecture that contains the necessary components to give (higher-
order) semantics to these illocutions in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Communication Framework
The communication language we consider, U , contains three fundamental primitives:1
Commit(α, β, ϕ) to represent, in ϕ, what is the world α aims at bringing about and
that β has the right to verify, complain about or claim compensation for any devia-
tions from, Observe(α, ϕ) to represent that a certain state of the world, ϕ, is observed,
and Done(u) to represent the event that a certain action u2 has taken place. In our
language, norms, contracts, and information chunks will be represented as instances
of Commit(·) where α and β can be individual agents or institutions, U is the set of
expressions u defined as:
u ::= illoc(α, β, ϕ, t) | u;u | Let context InuEnd
ϕ ::= term | Done(u) | Commit(α, β, ϕ) | Observe(α, ϕ) | ϕ ∧ ϕ |
ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∀v.ϕv | ∃v.ϕv
context ::= ϕ | id = ϕ | prolog_clause | context; context
where ϕv is a formula with free variable v, illoc is any appropriate set of illocutionary
particles, ‘;’ means sequencing, and context represents either previous agreements, pre-
vious illocutions, or code that aligns the ontological differences between the speakers
needed to interpret an action u, and term represents logical predicates. t represents a
point in time.3 We will note by Φ the set of expressions ϕ used as the propositional
content of illocutions.
For example, we can represent the following offer: “If you spend a total of more than
e100 in my shop during October then I will give you a 10% discount on all goods in
November”, as:
Offer(α, β,spent(β, α, October, X) ∧ X ≥ e100 →
∀ y. Done(Inform(ξ, α, pay(β, α, y), November)) → Commit(α, β, discount(y,10%)))
or, “If I tell you who I buy my tomatoes from then would you keep that information
confidential?” as:
Offer(α, β, ∃δ. (Commit(α,β,Done(Inform(α,β,provider(δ,α,tomato)))) ∧
∀γ. ∀ t. Commit(β,α,¬Done(Inform(β,γ,provider(δ,α,tomato), t))))
1 We will not detail this language as our focus is on new illocutionary moves requiring higher-
order semantics.
2 Without loss of generality we will assume that all actions are dialogical.
3 Usually dropped in the examples to simplify notation.
138 J. Debenham and C. Sierra
In order to define the terms of the language introduced above (e.g. pay(β, α, y) or
discount(y, 10%)) we need an ontology that includes a (minimum) repertoire of ele-
ments: a set of concepts (e.g. quantity, quality, material) organised in a is-a hierarchy
(e.g. platypus is a mammal, australian-dollar is a currency), and a set of relations over
these concepts (e.g. price(beer,AUD)).4
We model ontologies following an algebraic approach [4] as: An ontology is a tuple
O = (C,R,≤, σ) where:
1. C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic data types);
2. R is a finite set of relation symbols;
3. ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation on C (a partial order)
4. σ : R → C+ is the function assigning to each relation symbol its arity
where ≤ is a traditional is-a hierarchy, and R contains relations between the concepts
in the hierarchy.
The concepts within an ontology are closer, semantically speaking, depending on
how far away they are in the structure defined by the ≤ relation. Semantic distance
plays a fundamental role in strategies for information-based agency. How signed con-
tracts, Commit(·) about objects in a particular semantic region, and their execution
Observe(·), affect our decision making process about signing future contracts on nearby
semantic regions is crucial to modelling the common sense that human beings apply in
managing trading relationships. A measure [5] bases the semantic similarity between
two concepts on the path length induced by ≤ (more distance in the ≤ graph means
less semantic similarity), and the depth of the subsumer concept (common ancestor) in
the shortest path between the two concepts (the deeper in the hierarchy, the closer the
meaning of the concepts). Semantic similarity could then be defined as:
θ(c, c′) = e−κ1l · e
κ2h − e−κ2h
eκ2h + e−κ2h
where l is the length (i.e. number of hops) of the shortest path between the concepts,
h is the depth of the deepest concept subsuming both concepts, and κ1 and κ2 are
parameters scaling the contribution of shortest path length and depth respectively.
Agents give advice when they perceive that the listener has less experience in an
area. Advice is thus a rhetorical move that uses the asymmetry of information between
two agents. It is a genuine ecological move as it makes full sense in the context of a
dialogue where both sides are revealing their positions and thus its meaning can only
be determined in the context of the agents’ mutual evolving models of each other.
In the context of negotiation advice makes sense before the signing of the contract
— warning the other agent about potential consequences, “I advise you not buy a reflex
camera for your grand mother, they are too bulky”, or afterwards to justify a contract
violation, “if I were you I would be happy with receiving bottles from the 2008 vintage
instead of 2007, they are much better”. They are naturally composed of a comparison
between contracts or options and a justification.
4 Axioms defined over the concepts and relations are omitted here.
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3 Argumentation Agent Architecture
This Section describes how argumentative interactions are managed by our agent using
the LOGIC illocutionary framework [6] that was originally proposed for agents whose
sense of distributive justice spanned equity, equality and need. [6] focussed heavily on
the prelude stage of a negotiation where agents prepare using the five LOGIC dimen-
sions [7]. The five LOGIC dimensions are quite general:
– Legitimacy concerns information that may be part of or relevant to contracts signed.
– Options concerns contracts where a contract is a set of commitments one for each
agent in the contract.
– Goals are the objectives of the agents.
– Independence concerns the agent’s outside options — i.e. the set of agents are ca-
pable of satisfying the agent’s needs.
– Commitments are the commitments that an agent may have.
and are used in this paper to manage all incoming communications including the ex-
change of “I advise you. . . ” argumentative illocutions. A more formal representation
model for LOGIC is:
– L = {B(α, ϕ)}, that is a set of beliefs.
– O = {Plan(〈α1,Do(p1)〉, . . . , 〈αn,Do(pn)〉}, that is a set of joint plans
– G = {D(α, ϕ)}, that is a set of desires.
– I = {Can(α,Do(p))}, that is a set of capabilities.
– C = {I(α,Do(p))} ∪ {Commit(α,Do(p))}, that is a set of commitments and
intentions.
Our description is from the point of view of agent α in a multiagent system with a finite
number of other agents B = {β1, β2, . . . }, and a finite number of information providing
agents Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . } that provide the context for all events in the system — Θt
denotes the state of these agents at time t. The only thing that α ‘knows for certain’ is
its history of past communication that it retains in the repositoryHtα. Each utterance in
the history contains: an illocutionary statement, the sending agent, the receiving agent,
the time that the utterance was sent or received. Utterances are organised into dialogues,
where a dialogue is a finite sequence of related utterances.
α acts to satisfy a need, ν, that are considered in context (ν,Θt), and does so by
communicating an utterance, (μ, β), containing an illocutionary statement, μ ∈ U , to
another agent, β ∈ B. If an utterance is part of a complete dialogue, d, that aimed to
satisfy a need then the dialogue is tagged with: the triggering need, ν, the prevailing
context, Θt, and an ex post rating r ∈ R of how satisfactorily the dialogue satisfied the
need. Such a rated dialogue has the form: d = (d, ν,Θt, r) ∈ Htα.
Agent α observes the actions of another agent β in the context Θt. Observations are
of little value unless they can be verified. α may not posses a sufficient variety of sen-
sory input devices. Sensory inadequacy is dealt with by invoking a truthful institution
agent, ξ, that promptly reports what it sees. So if β commits to delivering twelve sar-
dines at 6:00pm, or states that “it will rain tomorrow” and is committed to the truth of
that prediction, then α will eventually verify those commitments when ξ advises what
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occurs. If β passes an “I advise you. . . ” message to α, or even a simple Inform(. . . )
message, we assume that β is committed to the validity of the contents.
All communication is recorded in Htα that in time may contain a large amount of
data. To make this data useful to α’s strategies it is summarised and categorised using
the LOGIC framework. To achieve this α requires a categorising function v : U →
P({L,O,G,I,C}) where U is the set of utterances. The power set, P({L,O,G,I,C}, is
required as some utterances belong to multiple categories. For example, “I will not pay
more for Protos5 than the price that John charges” is categorised as both Option and
Independence.
World Model. α’s world model, Mt, is the first way in which Htα is summarised. α’s
proactive reasoning machinery identifies the aspects of the world that α is interested in.
They are represented inMt as probability distributions, (Xi), in first-order probabilistic
logicL. Each of α’s plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt
together with associated update functions, Ks(·), such that KXis (μ) is a set of linear
constraints on the posterior distribution for Xi. Mt is then maintained from utterances
received using update functions that transform utterances into constraints on Mt.
Proactive reasoning is described in [8]. For example, in a simple multi-issue con-
tract negotiation α may estimate Pt(acc(β, α, δ)), the probability that β would accept
contract δ, by observing β’s responses. The distribution Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) is classified as
an Option in LOGIC. Using shorthand notation, if β sends the message Oﬀer(δ1) then
α may derive the constraint: Kacc(β,α,δ)(Oﬀer(δ1)) = {Pt(acc(β, α, δ1)) = 1}, and
if this is a counter offer to a former offer of α’s, δ0, then: Kacc(β,α,δ)(Oﬀer(δ1)) =
{Pt(acc(β, α, δ0)) = 0}. In the not-atypical special case of multi-issue bargaining
where the agents’ preferences over the individual issues only are known and are com-
plementary to each other’s, maximum entropy reasoning can be applied to estimate the
probability that any multi-issue δ will be acceptable to β by enumerating the possible
worlds that represent β’s “limit of acceptability” [9]. As another example, the predicate
canDo(α, β, ν) meaning β is able to satisfy α’s need ν — this predicate is classified as
Independence in LOGIC.
Updating Mt is complicated when the integrity of utterances received are ques-
tionable — it would certainly be foolish for α to believe completely every utterance
received. For completeness the procedure for doing this, and for attaching an a pri-
ori belief to utterances (see Equation 7), is summarised in Section 3.1. If at time t, α
receives such an utterance u that may alter this world model then the (Shannon) infor-
mation in u with respect to the distributions inMt is: It(u) = H(Mt)−H(Mt+1). Let
N t ⊆Mt be α’s model of agent β. If β sends the utterance u to α then the information
about β within u is: H(N t) − H(N t+1). Mt may contain distributions in any of the
five LOGIC categories, where H is Shannon entropy.
Intimacy and Balance Model. The intimacy and balance model is the second way in
whichHtα is summarised. Intimacy is degree of closeness, and balance is degree of fair-
ness. Informally, intimacy measures how much one agent knows about another agent’s
private information, and balance measures the extent to which information revelation
5 A fine wine from the ‘Ribera del Duero’ region, Spain.
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between the agents is ‘fair’. The intimacy and balance model is structured using the
LOGIC illocutionary framework and the ontology O6. For example, the communica-
tion Accept(β, α, δ) meaning that agent β accepts agent α’s previously offered deal δ
is classified as an Option, and Inform(β, α, info) meaning that agent β informs α about
info and commits to the truth of it is classified as Legitimacy. The intimacy and balance
model contains two components per agent: first α’s model of β’s private information,
and second, α’s model of the private information that β has about α.
The intimacy of α’s relationship with βi, Iti , is the amount that α knows about βi’s
private information and is represented as real numeric values over {L,O,G,I,C} × O.
Suppose α receives utterance u from βi and that category f ∈ v(u). For any concept
c ∈ O, define Θ(u, c) = maxc′∈u θ(c′, c). Denote the value of Iti in position (f, c) by
Iti(f,c) then: I
t
i(f,c) = ρ × It−1i(f,c) + (1 − ρ) × It(u) × Θ(u, c) for any c, where ρ is
the discount rate and It(u) is as defined above. α’s estimate of βi’s intimacy on α, J ti ,
is constructed similarly. The balance of α’s relationship with βi, Bti , is the element by
element numeric difference of Iti and J ti .
Trust, Reliability and Honour. The third way in which α summarises Htα is with trust,
reliability and honour measures. These concepts are all concerned with the relationship
between commitment and enactment. Trust is concerned with the relationship between
a signed contract (the commitment) and the execution of the contract (the enactment).
Reliability is is concerned with the relationship between information (where the truth
of the information is the commitment) and its subsequent verification (the enactment).
Honour is similarly concerned with arguments.
We represent the relationship between commitment and enactment using conditional
probabilities, P(u′|u). If u is a commitment and u′ the corresponding subsequent ob-
servation then P(u′| u) is the probability that u′ will be observed given that u had been
promised. For example, if u is an “I advise you. . . ” message from agent β then the con-
ditional probability, P(u′|u), is an estimate of α’s expectation of what will eventually
be observed, and the uncertainty in the validity of β’s communication is the entropy
H(u′|u).
[10] describes three aspects of the relationship between commitment and enactment:
1. as the difference between our expectation P(u′| u) and a distribution that describes
what we would ideally like to observe PI(u′| u):
1−
∑
u′
P
t
I(u
′|u) log P
t
I(u
′|u)
Ptβ(u′|u)
2. as expected preferability of the enactment compared to the commitment:
∑
u′
P
t(Prefer(u′, u))Ptβ(u
′|u)
6 Only a subset of the ontology is required. The idea is simply to capture “How much has Carles
told me about wine”, or “how much do I know about his commitments (possibly with other
agents) concerning cheese”.
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3. as predictability of those enactments that are preferable to the commitment:
1 +
1
B∗
·
∑
u′∈Φ+(u,v,κ)
P
t
+(u
′|u) logPt+(u′|u)
where if u ≤ v in the ontology let: Φ+(u, v, κ) =
{
u′ | Pt(Prefer(u′, u, v)) > κ}
for some constant κ, and Pt+(u′|u) is the normalisation of Ptβ(u′|u) for u′ ∈
Φ+(u, v, κ),
B∗ =
{
1 if |Φ+(u, v, κ)| = 1
log |Φ+(u, v, κ)| otherwise
There is no neat function mapping the concepts of trust, reliability and honour into
the five LOGIC categories. For example, the relationship between contractual com-
mitment and contractual enactment is concerned with both Options and Commitment.
Alternatively, the relationship between the commitment and enactment of an argument
is concerned with Legitimacy and what ever else the argument is about. However the
five LOGIC categories together provide a complete framework for representing these
concepts.
Self Model. Finally, α’s self model is not directly related to communication. It repre-
sents the LOGIC relationships between the agent’s components and the various sum-
maries of the communications received.
3.1 UpdatingMt
α’s world model,Mt, at time t is a set of random variables,Mt = {Xi, . . . , Xn} each
representing an aspect of the world that α is interested in. In the absence of in-coming
messages the integrity of Mt decays. α may have background knowledge concerning
the expected integrity as t → ∞. Such background knowledge is represented as a
decay limit distribution. One possibility is to assume that the decay limit distribution
has maximum entropy whilst being consistent with observations. Given a distribution,
P(Xi), and a decay limit distribution D(Xi), P(Xi) decays by:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (1)
where Δi is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) =
D(Xi). For example, Δi could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1− νi)×D(Xi)+ νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either the decay function or the
decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: Δti and Dt(Xi).
The following procedure updates Mt for all utterances u ∈ U . Suppose that α re-
ceives a message u from agent β at time t. Suppose that this message states “I advise
you that something is so” with probability z, and suppose that α attaches an epistemic
belief Rt(α, β, u) to u — a method for estimating Rt(α, β, u) is given below. Each
of α’s active plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt to-
gether with associated update functions7, Ks(·), such that KXis (u) is a set of linear
7 A sample update function for the distribution Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) is given above.
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constraints on the posterior distribution for Xi. Denote the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by
p, and let p(u) be the distribution with minimum relative entropy8 with respect to p:
p(u) = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
pj
that satisfies the constraints KXis (u). Then let q(u) be
the distribution:
q(u) = Rt(α, β, u)× p(u) + (1 − Rt(α, β, u))× p (2)
and then let:
P
t(Xi(u)) =
{
q(u) if q(u) is “more interesting” than p
p otherwise
(3)
A general measure of whether q(u) is more interesting than p is: K(q(u)‖D(Xi)) >
K(p‖D(Xi)), where K(x‖y) =
∑
j xj ln
xj
yj
is the Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distributions x and y.
Finally merging Equation 3 and Equation 1 we obtain the method for updating a
distribution Xi on receipt of a message u:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(u))) (4)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabilities: first, the proba-
bility z in the utterance u, and second the belief Rt(α, β, u) that α attached to u.
R
t(α, β, u) is an epistemic probability that takes account of α’s personal caution.
An empirical estimate of Rt(α, β, u) may be obtained by measuring the ‘difference’
between commitment and observation. Suppose that u is received from agent β at time
t and is verified by the institution agent, ξ, as u′ at some later time t′. Denote the prior
P
u(Xi) by p. Let p(u) be the posterior minimum relative entropy distribution subject to
the constraints KXis (u), and let p(u′) be that distribution subject to KXis (u′). We now
estimate whatRu(α, β, u) should have been in the light of knowing now, at time t′, that
u should have been u′.
The idea of Equation 2, is that Rt(α, β, u) should be such that, on average across
Mt, q(u) will predict p(u′) — no matter whether or not u was used to update the dis-
tribution for Xi, as determined by the condition in Equation 3 at time u. The observed
reliability for u and distribution Xi, RtXi(α, β, u)|u′, on the basis of the verification of
u with u′, is the value of k that minimises the Kullback-Leibler distance:
R
t
Xi(α, β, u)|u′ = argmink K(k · p(u) + (1 − k) · p ‖ p(u′))
The predicted information in u with respect to Xi is:
I
t
Xi (α, β, u) = H
t(Xi)−Ht(Xi(u)) (5)
8 Given a probability distribution p, the minimum relative entropy distribution q = (q1, . . . , qI)
subject to a set of n linear constraints g = {gj(p) = aj ·q−cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , n (that must
include the constraint
∑
i qi−1 = 0) is: q = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
pj
. This may be calculated
by introducing Lagrange multipliers λ: L(q,λ) =
∑
j qj log
qj
pj
+ λ · g. Minimising L,
{ ∂L
∂λj
= gj(p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , n is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to ∂L∂qi =
0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventually to q. Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference
that is convenient when the data is sparse [11] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [12].
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that is the reduction in uncertainty in Xi where H(·) is Shannon entropy. Equation 5
takes account of the value of Rt(α, β, u).
If X(u) is the set of distributions in Mt that u affects, then the observed reliability
of β on the basis of the verification of u with u′ is:
R
t(α, β, u)|u′ = 1|X(u)|
∑
i
R
t
Xi(α, β, u)|u′ (6)
For any concept c ∈ O, Rt(α, β, c) is α’s estimate of the reliability of information
from β concerning c. In the absence of incoming communications the integrity of this
estimate will decay in time by: Rt(α, β, c) = χ × Rt−1(α, β, c) for decay constant
χ < 1 and close to 1. On receipt of communication u is subsequently verified as u′:
R
t(α, β, c) = μ× Rt−1(α, β, c) + (1− μ)× Rt(α, β, u)|u′ (7)
where μ is the learning rate, that estimates the reliability of β’s advice on any concept
c. If X(u) are independent the predicted information in u is:
I
t(u) =
∑
Xi∈X(u)
I
t
Xi (α, β, u) (8)
Suppose α sends message u to β where u is α’s private information, then assuming that
β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors α’s, α can estimate It(β, α, u). This completes the the
update process for Mt.
4 Advice Interaction
An opinion is a speaker’s evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in context. Advice
is a speaker’s evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in the context of the speaker’s
beliefs of the listener’s context. An “I advise you. . . ” illocution is a form of advice [13].
It is a directive in Searle’s classification of speech acts. This illocution gives advice to
the listener to take some action, for example, “I advise you I would buy that Ferrari.”
It is not an assertive. Such advice will only be considered seriously by the listener if he
believes that the speaker’s beliefs about him are accurate. In terms of this work, this is
indicated by a degree of intimacy in the appropriate section of the LOGIC framework.
An agent may be motivated to issue an “I advise you. . . ” illocution either to develop
a reputation for giving good advice — in the LOGIC framework this develops intimacy
particularly in the L dimension — or to directly influence the listener’s actions possi-
bly to the benefit of the speaker “If I were you I would accept the offer I made you
yesterday”. The rational effect of these two examples are different. In the first example,
whether the listener follows the advice is not important, what matters is whether he
believes at some time that the advice was good, in the second example, the intention is
that the listener will follow the advice.
“I advise you. . . ” illocutions may be issued with varying degrees of knowledge of
the state of the listener. For example, “I advise you to buy the Ferrari.” assumes that
the speaker has beliefs about the listener’s intentions — such as he intends to buy a
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car. Another example, “If I were you I would offer them e100 now” assumes that the
speaker has beliefs about both the listener’s intentions and the state of his active plans.
For simplicity we restrict these beliefs to the listener’s intentions.
In common usage, an “I advise you. . . ” illocution may contain advice either to act
(i.e. advice that the listener should utter) as described above, or that the listener should
modify his mental attitudes “I advise you to count on tomorrow being fine”. The first
of these is an “I advise you” action, and the second, that advises the agent to modify
his beliefs, is an “I advise you” belief change9. In addition, such advice may advise the
listener to modify his goals, his intentions or his plans — these three cases are omitted
for brevity. A definition of an “I advise you” action is given in Table 1. The definition
of an “I advise you” belief change is not presented here.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have argued that a a rich model of rationality is required to properly
model agents in a changing world. Particularly important is the need to model dialogical
moves that refer to the agent’s internal models (beliefs, or goals) that are updated as a
dialogue develops. Traditional constructivist approaches share a more static view of the
world. Dialogues may influence internal models along a number of dimensions. In this
paper we have followed a simplified version of the approach of [6] classifying them
as beliefs, plans, desires, capabilities and intentions. This model is very flexible and
clear in representing and classifying the evolving pieces of information that an agent’s
memory requires in order to correctly interpret and generate illocutionary moves. We
have given a precise model of how this evolution of the memory can be implemented
using concepts drawn from information-theory. Finally, a formal description of a pro-
totypical dialogical move, “I advise you . . . ”, is given. We have argued, that if agents
are to be situated in a changing world, they need to incorporate an ecological mind that
among other things requires a higher order interpretation of communication languages.
This is so, because self-reference and the reference to whole dialogues is unavoidable
in argumentative information exchanges.
As future lines of work, we plan to extend this approach to further advice-giving
illocutions, and to revisit other classical dialogical moves such as those found in negoti-
ation dialogues (e.g. propose, accept, reject). The evolution of our information-theoretic
agents is being further examined in the development of negotiation agents in the Diplo-
macy game: we plan to use a Diplomacy testbed (www.dipgame.org) to obtain exper-
imental results from agents interacting with human beings using rich languages that
have illocutionary moves similar to the one modelled here.
9 In line with the remarks at the beginning of this section the assertive “Tomorrow will be fine”
may be treated as an Inform; when that statement is verified by the listener he will feed that into
his estimate of the speaker’s reliability as in Section 3.1. The directive “I advise you to count
on tomorrow being fine.” is a richer statement. It relies on the speaker’s weather forecasting
ability and on the accuracy of his beliefs of the listener. In particular, it relies on the accuracy
of the speaker’s beliefs concerning the significance of tomorrow’s weather to what ever the
listener is doing. That is it relies on a level of intimacy. The subsequent evaluation of this piece
of advice will then effect the speaker’s intimacy represented in the LOGIC model.
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Table 1. Advice actions in FIPA-style format. The two feasibility preconditions are alternative
representations of i’s beliefs of the superiority of his knowledge, and the two rational effects
represent two possible motives for uttering the illocution.
Summary The sender (for example, i) informs the receiver (for example, j) that the sender
believes the receiver should perform some action (for example, a) if the receiver’s
intentions includes some goal (for example, c)
Message A tuple consisting of an action expression denoting the action that is advised, and
Content an intention that the receiver may hold.
Description I_Advise_You indicates that the sending agent:
• believes he knows the receiving agent holds a particular intention
• believes his knowledge of facts concerning the receiving agent’s intention is
better than the receiving agent’s knowledge of it
• intends the receiving agent to believe that the action is in his interests
• believes that the receiving agent may act otherwise
Formal <i, i_advise_you(j,a,c) >
Model FP1: Bi Ij c ∧ Bi Wi(c)→ Wj\i(c) ∧ Bi Agent(j, a) ∧
¬Bi Ij Done(a)
FP2: Bi Ij c ∧ Bi (H(Wi(c)) < H(Wj\i(c))) ∧
Bi Agent(j, a) ¬Bi Ij Done(a)
RE1: Bj Ii Done(<j, rates(a, x)>,φ) where rates(a,x) is
the action of rating action a as x, and φ is true when the rating is performed
RE2: Done (a)
Wi(c) denotes all of i’s beliefs concerning c — i.e. that part of i’s world model
Wj\i(c) denotes i’s beliefs concerning all of j’s beliefs concerning c
Wi(c)→ Wj\i(c) denotes that everything in Wj\i(c) can be derived from
a subset of Wi(c)
H(S) denotes the overall uncertainty of the set of beliefs S — possibly as entropy
Examples Agent i advises agent j that from his understanding of agent j’s intentions agent
j should accept an offer from agent k to sell a Nikon camera to agent j.
(i_advise_you
:sender (agent-identifier :name i)
:receiver (set (agent-identifier :name j))
:content
"((advise-action (agent-identifier :name j)
(accept-proposal
:sender (agent-identifier :name j)
:receiver (set (agent-identifier :name k))
:content
”accept the Nikon”
(”want camera”))"
:language fipa+if_I_were_you+advise-action)
where advise-action is an action that the receiver is advised to perform
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